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POWERS OF HORROR: JEWISH LAW 
AND THE EPISTLE OF BARNABAS 
Patrick West 
The things I will be saying about the Jewish Law in the following 
paper are motivated by my interest in the question of history. I want 
to deal with history at the abstract level of its rules of operation, and 
not with regard to its empirical effects. I am therefore not interested in 
historicism, because I am not concerned to 'relativize' or 'contextualize' 
a specific historical event; rather, I want to explore what one particular 
event or text - namely the Jewish Law - has to say about the processes 
and structures by which history itself is organized. This is a crucial 
distinction: it is based on the difference between a study that 'assumes' 
history and goes on to explore one or another of its discrete moments 
or trends, and a study (like this one) that takes history as its object in 
what must be in the first instance a radically ahistorical gesture. My 
strategy in this paper will be to interrogate Julia Kristeva's 
interpretation of the primarily dietary edicts of Exodus, Leviticus and 
Deuteronomy with my own reading of the apocryphal Epistle of 
Bamabas. 1 My basic project is an attempt to resuscitate a theory of 
'historicity' in the field of a theoretical paradigm - 'structuralism' -
precisely considered to be antithetical to any sustained engagement 
with historical thinking. More specifically, the structuralist project 
excludes history from its considerations to the extent that it operates 
on the basis of a scientific model (the linguistic sign) that has no room 
for the historical interruptions and potentialities that characterize those 
rare discourses (for instance, certain forms of marxism) that fracture 
the established power structures of society. Unthinkingly, structuralism 
holds to an implicit model of history that is powerful in its force to 
prevent the irruption of a genuinely liberating or revolutionary mode 
of history. Structuralism therefore operates in a sort of 'endless 
present' and can seemingly make no comment on the concept of 
history itsel£.2 This is the situation I intend to redress here. I want to 
question the more usual imputation that structuralism and, by 
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extension, most brands of psychoanalysis, can say nothing of value 
about history. With this in mind, I want to begin with the 
interpretation of the Jewish Law put forward in Powers of Horror: An 
Essay on Abjection by the french psychoanalyst, semiotician and 
literary critic Julia Kristcva. 
Kristeva's interests lie in the field of the relations of the subject to 
language: in particular, most of her texts concentrate on the tension 
between the absolute importance of language for proper socialization, 
and, the consequences of exploring the limits and the edges of 
language, primarily in artistic discourses. This very general summary of 
her work provides the context for her analysis of the Jewish Law, 
which proceeds on the terms of the psychoanalytic constitution of the 
subject. The key term of this analysis is 'abjection'.3 Abjection 
describes the failure of the subject to com11lete the separation from its 
primary and fundamental object: the Mother. It is a position in the 
development of the Oedipus complex where it emerges prior to both 
the mirror stage and the threat of castration. rt therefore constitutes 
the most archaic and the weakest desire on the part of the not-yet-
fully-constituted subject. Abjection is closely associated with a 
psychotic foreclosure or expulsion of the paternal signifier or, more 
correctly, of the first realization of this signifier in the guise of what 
Freud labelled the 'father of individual prehistory'. The presence of 
abjection in the patient consequently indicates a subject who is outside 
the realm of meaning and society. In linguistic terms, abjection acts as 
a threat to the speaking capacity of the subject, which depends on the 
absolute symbolic distinction of subject from object. 
There arc two parts to Kristcva's definition of abjection. I now 
want to turn to the second of these. Kristeva argues that any 'halfway' 
or 'indeterminate' process or state can be regarded as a representation 
of the abject. Abjection by this token identifies a general crisis of 
limits and borders: it will therefore he that which disturbs the 
separations that construct and maintain the permanence of our 
identities. This serves to introduce Kristeva's reading of the text of the 
Jewish Law. One of the best-known instances of the Jewish Law is 
found in both Exodus and Deuteronomy: "You shall not boil a kid in 
its mother's milk".4 Kristcva isolates the precise intention of this law as 
a concern to maintain proper boundaries of separation and distinction. 
In her reading, it is the integrity of the border itself that separates the 
Jewish race from the outside. To this extent, the nauseating 'half-
boundary' between two versions of the 'same' in the previous example 
(milk/that nurtured by milk) marks a trespass of the Law for the Jew. 
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The work of Mary Douglas is cited by Kristeva as astutely emphasizing 
"the logical conformity of Levitical abominations, which, without a 
design of "separation" and "individual integrity," would be 
incomprehensible."5 
Given that separation is for Kristeva a necessary requirement for 
the proper development of the psychoanalytically 'normal' speaking 
subject, she draws from her theory of abjection a crucial contrast 
between Jew and anti-Semite. She identifies the figure of the Jew as 
the paradigmatic expression of 'normal', completed Oedipal 
development (that is, a subject marked 'cleanly and properly' beneath 
the rubric of an absolute separation from the Mother). On the other 
hand, she characterizes the historical figure opposed to the Jew - the 
anti-Semite - as subject to abjection. The Jew, therefore, as the 
Oedipal and speaking subject. The anti-Semite, therefore, as the failure 
of Oedipus and the failure of language. 
This is an appropriate point at which to summarize the position so 
far, before proceeding to the consequences it holds for a theory of 
history. Kristeva's essay of 1980, Powers of Horror, isolates the key 
element of the Jewish Law as a concern with separation and 
distinction. In line with her psychoanalytic motivations, she argues that 
the fundamental text of Judaism is therefore equivalent to the most 
basic structures of the Oedipal or speaking subject, which relies on an 
absolute symbolic distinction between subject and object. The Jewish 
exclusion of the Mother repeats exactly the initiating moment of the 
subject's linguistic capacity. Abjection, on the other hand, identifies a 
general crisis of limits and borders: it refers to the ambiguous and 
nauseating moment in which the subject fails in its separation from its 
primary object: the Mother. The Jew, authorized resident of the 
Symbolic Order of language, is thus contrasted with the anti-Semite, 
who indicates the failure of Oedipus and the subsequent irruption of 
abjection. What I now want to explore is the implicit model of history 
that is a direct accompaniment to the pattern of Kristeva's thought that 
I have just outlined. 
Kristeva's theory of language reveals her structuralist affiliations to 
the extent that she positions history as always a consequence, in a 
highly reactive fashion, of the unfolding of the sign. In a monumental 
or mythic understanding of history, Kristeva isolates Judaism and anti-
Semitism as the indexes of the only possible historical structures in a 
world in which history finds its absolute definition in the sign. These 
two structures mirror the system in which the Jew is bound to 
signification via the imprint of scripture, while the anti-Semite is 
1994 CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 451 
similarly defined by its failure to occupy the sign: that is, via abjection. 
While the form of history implied by the figure of the anti- emile 
would seem to offer an exit rrom history as a functi n of the sign, 
what abjection in fact indicates i a fai lure of Lhe ign that inevitably 
stays withjn its confines: the tn1cture f abjection, and Lhis is what 
gives Kristeva's theory of history such massive force, is inherent in the 
structure of the sign. Abjection is always anticipated by language. 
History will always defer to the sign: this is the fundamental point of 
Kristeva's work, on the basis of which the question of the relative 
success or the failure of the sign is of marginal importance only. To a 
large extent, Kristeva inherits her conception of history from the 
structuralist ideas of Jacques Lacan; however, as will become evident, 
it is the work of Lacan that also provides a different interpretation of 
the interpretation of history put forward in Kristeva's text. I am 
seeking to interrogate Kristeva's work with the help of a concept 
drawn from the theories of her primary intellectual mentor, Lacan, yet 
one which is generally neglected in her own texts. I am referring here 
to the concept of the Lacanian Real Order, but to understand its 
relevance to my paper it is necessary to consider first the Epistle of 
Barnabas.6 
The Epistle of Barnabas was most probably wriLten between AD 
96 and AD 98.7 The male author is almost certainly not to be 
identified with the Apostle Barnabas mentioned in the Acts of the 
Apostles, a companion of Saint Paul.8 Best understood as a tractate in 
the form of an epistle, the anonymous text has been generally 
established as the work of one person and many commentators accord 
it a clear unity in form and content.9 It is therefore worthy of intensive 
scholarship. One of the most interesting questions to emerge in any 
summary of Barnabas concerns the religious affiliations of its author: 
he has been variously described as a Jewish Christian, a Gentile with 
knowledge of particular Jewish traditions, and most explicitly as "an 
Alexandrian Jew, whose Judaism had helped him but little, and had 
been wholly abandoned in favour of the Christian faith which had 
really met the needs of his soul".10 It is certain that he and those 
associated with his thought possessed an ambiguous relationship to 
both Jewish and Christian thinking. Obviously the central characteristic 
of this tension has its logic in the theological negotiation of the Old 
Testament with the New Testament, and the various contradictions and 
reconciliations that are apparent here. Barnabas has been situated at 
different times inside and outside of the canon of biblical writings. 11 
This last aspect of the text finds its logic in Barnabas' use of an 
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expansive range of canonical and non-canonical written and oral 
sources: these include texts from different prophets, words that are 
nowhere apparent in canonical writings, and further assorted 
enumerations of sayings and quotations.12 
The audience for the Epistle of Barnabas comprised a certain group 
of uncircumcised Jewish-Christians whose faith was at potential or 
actual risk from a resurgent Judaism.13 The nature of this threat is 
unclear. It is often linked, nevertheless, to the destruction of the temple 
in AD 70 and the more or less frequent attempts, associated with the 
nationalistic and religious hopes of the Jews, at rebuilding it.14 What is 
patent is that the text must be regarded in the light of some massive 
circumstance of contemporary origin. However, I do not want to enter 
the debate surrounding the isolation of this event. It appears to me 
alternatively that the very ambiguities and difficulties that attach to 
Barnabas in the field of its historical context and historical 
consequences appear to support my basic proposal: namely, that this 
neglected and recondite text in fact performs a brilliant and exciting 
reworking of the organization of the structure of history that is 
indicated in Kristeva's study. Rather than looking for a specific 
historical event which could have triggered the construction of this text, 
I want to suggest that what most commentators understand as a 
problem of context is actually a problem of text. That is, Barnabas 
does not follow the logic of the sign in describing an event of 
contemporary significance; rather, the text takes history into itself as a 
constituting aspect of its functioning. On a more mundane level, what 
Barnabas highlights are those minor characteristics of the Jewish Law 
which, while they arc discernible in its canonical manifestations, are 
nevertheless superficial enough to pass without notice in Kristeva's 
interpretation. The apocryphal work highlights these features in the 
established text, and thus motivates my direct interrogation of 
Kristeva's theory. 
Kristeva argues, as I have already explained, that the Jewish Law is 
posited on the structure of separation as a basis for linguistic and social 
competence. Separation stands in opposition to abjection. Kristeva 
acknowledges the existence of other interpretations of the Jewish Law 
(and in fact can only account for certain instances of it by discarding 
them as "specious prohibitions") 15 but she maintains in dogmatic 
fashion that these other interpretative positions in fact "do no more 
than unilaterally emphasize the complex dynamics of biblical thought 
concerning impurity". 16 This appears at first blush to indicate a rather 
glib dismissal of alternative readings on the part of Kristeva. What 
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now want to point out, however is that Kristeva's exegesis here has 
the particular value of highlighting not only the similarities Lhat she 
must be finding in the otherwise diverse work of various biblical 
commentators, but more importantly the assumptions which must be at 
the base of her claims to be able to establish a sameness between the 
positions they represent. The deep influence of structuraust thought on 
Kristeva's work is revealed, among other ways, in her insistence on a 
scientific universality for her theories. Roland Barthes comments that 
Kristeva's work "takes up all the space it deals with, fills it precisely, 
making it necessary for anyone who counts himself out to reveal 
himself as an opponent or a censor". 17 And the content of this space 
mentioned in Barlhes' analysis is, not surprisingly, the operations of 
language itself. This explains her reluctance to grant any theoretical 
autonomy to those other positions on biblical impurity Kristeva 
mentions in Powers of Horror. They all, in her eyes, defer to the ign. 
This clement of Kristeva's thought highlights a challenge to any critical 
interrogation of Kristeva that seeks to retain some aspects of her 
theories while discarding others: that is, a study like my own that 
attempts in debating her work to avoid either outright opposition or 
blind obedience to it. The nature of this challenge will become obvious 
in what follows. 
To summarize: Kristeva understands language as a saturation of 
history in which historical activity reflects nothing more than the 
constant structure of Lhe sign. She reads this theory as a consequence 
of the laws of separation and distinction that her interpretation I cates 
in the Jewish Law. However, to move the argument to its next tage, is 
it necessary to defer without right of appeal to Kristeva's claim that 
separation always and inevitably denotes the precise structure of 
language, and no other, that she claims it does? I want to suggest that 
if we retain the idea of separation as the indication of some form of 
language that is not necessarily identical with the linguistic structure 
posited by Kristeva - with all the implications the latter holds for our 
understanding of history - then we can interrogate her work without 
absolutely opposing it. 
I want to now move directly to the Epistle of Barnabas. The 
apocryphal work is not closed to the interpretation based on the 
opposition between separation and abjection that Kristeva locates in 
the canonical text. However, it indicates at the same time a second 
feature that is not accounted for in Powers of Horror. This aspect of 
the Jewish Law concerns the material as opposed to the symbolic 
conditions of the survival of the Jewish population. Baruch A. Levine's 
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recent study of the dietary regulations accommodates Kristeva's 
position while situating it at another level that implies a different 
formation of language and, by extension, a different formation of 
history. 18 That is, to take a central instance of the Jewish Law, the 
characteristic association of split hoofs and an ability to chew the cud 
as a prerequisite for purity is understood by Levine as only a 
secondary indicator of a previous distinction. A distinction to be sure, 
thus implying a form of language, but one that pre-exists the structure 
of language defined in Kristeva's analysis. For Kristeva, the creatures 
that possess such attributes by that fact follow the logic of separation 
and propriety. "The pure," she writes "wiii be that which conforms to 
an established taxonomy; the impure, that which unsettles it, 
establishes intermixture and disorder." 19 For Levine, on the other hand, 
if food takes on a symbolic value, it also retains its functioning as a 
necessity for physical survival. I do not want this to be understood as 
simply a question of hygiene or health; rather, it is contingent on the 
symbolic organization of the economic habits of a people dedicated to 
their own survival in what must now emerge as a new historical space. 
Levine notes, for instance, an emphasis on those animals, fish and 
birds that would be naturally found in the domesticated surroundings 
of settlements.20 The key issue for Levine is one of a people and their 
economic habits, as defined by the population's relation to such factors 
as climate, environment and geography: that is, the fact of the species. 
Barnabas is sympathetic to just such a reading: 
You shall eat neither eagle, nor hawk, nor kite, nor crow. Do 
not, He means, associate with, or resemble, such people as do 
not know how to obtain their food by sweat and labor, but, in 
their disregard for law, plunder other people's property. While 
walking about in seeming simplicity of heart, they watch 
sharply whom they may rob to satisfy their greed - just as 
these birds alone do not provide their own food, but, sitting 
idle, look for a chance to devour the flesh of others - the 
mischievous pest they aref1 
What is demonstrated in this passage is a concern with production, 
consumption and the distribution of resources by various means. A 
design of separation is apparent here; but what also presses its claims 
on interpretation is a particular stress on the material agency of 
circumstances that are beyond the model of language proposed by 
Kristeva. The text of Barnabas disrupts therefore the argument of 
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Powers of Horror in a way that invites exploration in two distinct yet, 
as I hope to demonstrate, related directions. 
The often neglected Real Order of Lacanian theory serves as a 
conceptual rubric for the argument 1 will be ctling in place as a 
conclusion to Lhis paper. Distinct from the naive concept of a prc-
di. cursive reality, the Real indicates both the impos ible point at which 
the Symbolic Order di appear. at its juncture with the physical world 
in addition to the biological processes of what Kristeva, focusing on Lhc 
role of the Mother identifies as the survival of the species.22 It is 
biological and symbolic. rts application to my reading of Barnabas i. 
therefore crucial, because it contain the two features that I have 
highlighted in Barnabas: a new version of the ign, and, a concern with 
the conditions of the survival f a p pulati n, the human . pccies. The 
Real provides a means for retaining the Kristevan emphasis on the 
necessity of language for the subject's successful entry into cultruc, 
while at the same time accommodating a concept of history free fr m 
the normative restraints of a structuralist analy is. tt acknowledges the 
need for the sign while introducing a material and rev()luti nary 
element to the life of the subject. If hi tory is to be anything other 
than either a slave to the sign or a function of luck, chance and 
aleatory events, then its encounter with the Real must be 
acknowledged and encouraged. 
In this respect, the work of Slavoj Zizek, a Lacanian theorist from 
the former Yugoslav republic of Slovenia, provides a cogent account of 
the Real Order which gives some idea of the scale of the massive 
reworking of history that it implics.23 Zi.zek does not provide the 
particular characteriz.ation of the Real thal T have tried to present in 
the form of the role of the species merged with a new organi7.ation f 
the sign. However, his work is comparatively rare in psychoanalytic 
and structuralist discourse in its enthusiasm for the Real. Zizck' 
position runs as follows: 
This kernel of the Real encircled by failed attempts to 
symbolize-totalize it is radically non-historical: history itself is 
nothing but a succession of failed attempts to grasp, conceive, 
specify this strange kernel ... the ultimate mistake of 
historicism in which all historical content is "relativizcd", made 
dependent on ''historical circumstances," - that is to say, of 
historicism as opposed to historicity - is that it evades the 
encounter with the Rcal.24 
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This paper has attempted to clear the theoretical ground for the 
emergence of the Real Order in an as yet unrecognizable space of 
history. Such a project strikes me as one of the very few ways still 
open to us for the construction of a revolutionary discourse capable of 
'giving the slip' to the sign, which not only ensures our survival, but 
imprisons it as well. 
University of Melbourne 
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